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Identity theft has become more prevalent in
recent years; about 10 million incidents occur
each year.1 IT professionals must understand
the need for personally identifiable information
(PII) discovery to protect themselves and their
company from the civil, legal and financial
liabilities caused by data loss. As documents
migrate to digital form from hard copy, sensitive
personal information gets stored in a variety of
places digitally. National and international laws
are in place requiring companies to search for
confidential data to ensure compliance. Some
US examples include the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA). At the state level in the US, New
York State’s Disposal of Personal Records Law
(2006) requires businesses to “properly dispose
of records containing personal information,”
implying that this information must be unreadable
and unrecoverable. International privacy laws,
many of which are more stringent than those in
the US, require similar activity.2
To comply with these laws, security
professionals use a variety of sensitive
information discovery tools to find and remove
readily available information stored on end-point
devices. While current PII discovery tools can
find information that is readily available, they are
not capable of discovering information that has
been encrypted, obfuscated, hidden, deleted or is
otherwise unrecoverable. It is critical to note that
the content and metadata of deleted files can be
easily recovered using standard forensics tools.
This paper will introduce computer forensics
techniques to reveal sensitive data that are likely
to be missed by PII tools, including data in RAM
memory, graphics files, registry information or
files marked as deleted.

PII BACKGROUND
Where Do Existing PII Tools Look for
Sensitive Data?
PII tools typically search through the directory tree,
looking at the content of allocated files, e-mail and
the like for keywords or strings that indicate the
file needs further investigation. For example, the
tools might search for files that contain strings of
16 digits that could represent a credit card number.
The strength of current PII tools is to quickly find
possible PII in locations in which data are visible
to the operating system. However, they do not
provide support for searching data outside of these
traditional areas. For example, if a file containing
the same string of 16 digits had been deleted,
the current PII tools would not find the file even
though it may be recoverable. Deleted files are
considered unallocated and are not available to
view by PII tools.
Where Else Can Information Reside and Hide?
Data can reside in places that the operating
system can see as well as places that are invisible
to it. Most of these nontraditional locations are
completely overlooked by PII tools but can still
harbor sensitive information. Some examples of
these areas include:
• Metadata—Metadata contains file information
about the actual data in the file. Metadata can
include who created the information, what the
information is about, when the file was created/
modified/accessed, and other information that
can describe particulars about the data file.
Metadata can provide a place for sensitive
data to reside, but it is not particularly easy to
remove.
• Recycle bin and unallocated space—When a file
is deleted in a Windows machine, for example,
the file appears in the recycle bin. The complete
path and file name are stored in a hidden file
called INFO2 in the recycled or recycler folder.

After emptying the recycle bin, the corresponding entries in
INFO2 are also deleted. However, when the file is removed
from the recycle bin, the system simply marks the space
previously occupied by this file to be “available for use.”
Metadata information as well as the original contents of the
file remain on the hard drive, completely intact until the
space is allocated to new files and the original information is
overwritten with new data. As storage becomes less expensive
and hard drives increase in size, deleted files are likely to
remain in unallocated space longer.
• Alternate data streams3—Microsoft’s New Technology
File System (NTFS) uses “streams” to store file content.
A stream is a link to a data storage location. NTFS allows
multiple streams of data to be associated with a file but only
the default (main) stream is normally displayed to the user.
One could hide sensitive data in any number of alternate
streams associated with a host file with no apparent changes
to the host file.
• Files with modified extensions—File extensions are the
characters following the dot in a filename, e.g., text.txt.
They indicate a file’s data type but can easily be changed
by the user. Each file also has a file header that uniquely
identifies the file type. Adversaries often attempt to disguise
the true nature of a file by changing the file’s extension.
Such changes can make it difficult for PII detection tools to
find sensitive information in a file.
• Graphics and images—Pictures, images and graphics can
contain information that may be considered private or
sensitive. For example, a screen capture of a spreadsheet
page with account or other character-based information will
not be read as a character-based file.
• Print spool files—Printing involves a spooling process. For
a print job, the file’s content is written to a spool file (.SPL)
and a separate graphics file (.EMF) for each page. These
Print Spool files are saved to disk until the print is done and
then deleted.
• Link or shortcut files—Link files are shortcuts pointing to
the actual files that allow users to launch programs, open
files and folders, or connect to a URL. They contain path
information to allow the operating system to navigate to the
location of the actual data file.
• RAM and page files—Some sensitive information may be
found only from the computer’s RAM and in its page files.
At other times, such data will be written to disk if a machine
is suspended or hibernated.

• E-mail—E-mail, instant messages and other communication
traffic can contain sensitive information.
• Registry hive—The Windows registry contains settings
specific to the hardware, applications, services, security and
users on the system. Much potentially valuable information
is stored there. Such information includes user and group
identities and passwords and Internet history, including
cookies and records of queries such as searches and lists of
recently accessed files.
PII TOOLS AND FINDINGS
Existing PII tools
Both open source and commercial products are available
to assist in detecting sensitive data on digital media. Some
examples include:
• Find_SSN
• Sensitive Number Finder (SENF)
• Spider
• Identity Finder
Find_SSN is a simple-to-use Windows application.
Developed by Virginia Tech, Find_SSN searches for files
that may contain data matching the known patterns of
Social Security numbers. Find_SSN does not scan PDF
and Microsoft Outlook PST files, and files larger than 100
megabytes. SENF is a tool written by the information security
group at the University of Texas at Austin. It has similar
search capabilities as Find_SSN. Cornell University’s Spider
is an open source, more sophisticated scanning tool that can
scan archives, documents and spreadsheets after selecting
a target directory. However, Spider does not scan PDF and
Microsoft Outlook PST files. Identity Finder is a commercial
search tool capable of locating and identifying personal
information (such as Social Security, credit card and bank
account numbers as well as passwords or dates of birth) in
files, e-mail, databases, registry entries and web browser
caches. However, even with Identity Finder, there are still
many areas not in its search path.
Testing the PII tools
To test the limits of the existing PII tools, a variety of files
were created including .pdf, .xls, .doc, .txt and archive files on
a USB drive. Two of these files were deleted to test whether
the tools search for deleted files in unallocated space. The
file text.txt was also renamed to text.jpg to test whether the
tools are capable of detecting sensitive data from a file with
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its extension modified. A file was also created that did not
contain Social Security numbers in its main content, but had
these data hidden in an alternate data stream. Note that none
of the deleted files had been overwritten.
In addition, the tools were run against a live Windows
machine so they could interrogate files that could not be
stored on the USB drive, such as deleted Microsoft Outlook
(*.pst) files, the Windows registry, alternate data streams, files
in the recycle bin, print spool files and RAM data.
To interrogate files from the USB test drive, each tool was
directed to run against the drive image and the results were
recorded. For other files not stored on the drive, the tool was
directed to the location on the hard drive where those files
would normally reside. All the test files are listed in figure 1.
Results From Running These Tools
The Find_SSN, SENF and Spider tools discovered only a
limited subset of the conditions presented. Identity Finder,
on the other hand, improved on the capability to identify PII
when compared to the other PII tools tested. Identity Finder
not only detected all of the conditions found with the other
tools, but also discovered PII in renamed files, PDFs, registry
entries and .pst files. However, all of these tools still had
limited capability to detect sensitive information stored in
metadata, alternate data streams, graphics files, printer spools,
RAM and page files. Additionally, none of the tools could
identify PII that exists in unallocated space (if the recycle bin
has been emptied, for example) even though the PII remains
intact on the disk. All of these areas represent potential data
leakage areas for the current PII tools.
A summary of the results is shown in figure 1.
Limitations of PII Tools
The current PII identification tools search for sensitive data—
either through user-specified directories or starting at the
root directory. They are not designed to find information that
has been obfuscated, encrypted, deleted or otherwise hidden.
Figure 1 shows that PII identification tools miss finding
information in areas including unallocated space (i.e., deleted
files that can be recovered), e-mail and deleted e-mail, files
open and locked or auto-saved by other processes, system
files (executables, DLLs, hibernation files), the Windows
registry, application-specific database files, memory and page
files, metadata, graphics files (screenshots, thumbnails, RPM,
TIFF, JPG, EMF, etc.), intentionally hidden PII in digital
3
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data (digital steganography, for example), as well as links
or indirect references to PII. These limitations may lead to
inaccurate results with false positives and false negatives.
FORENSICS TOOLS AND FINDINGS
As mentioned previously, the current existing PII
identification tools search only within the file system and are
not capable of detecting information in deleted files, or from
any location not normally accessible to a nonprivileged user.
Modern forensic tools can help to bridge this gap. Forensic
tools are designed to recover and analyze data that has been
intentionally or unintentionally deleted or otherwise hidden.
Originally, this class of tools was associated with activities
in the law enforcement sector and was used exclusively to
discover legal evidence. Recently, they have been seen widely
used in business and corporate environments.
Forensic tools are capable of bypassing the limits imposed
by the operating system and can find file content that has
been deleted (i.e., no longer available to the operating system)
or has been stored in a place not typically accessible to a user,
such as RAM or the registry. They can display files stored in
a variety of formats, allowing a knowledgeable user to find
information that would otherwise appear to be inaccessible.
While forensic tools’ strength is their capability to search
nontraditional areas in which data can be hidden, their
weakness is that they can be time-consuming as they search so
much more of the system than PII tools.
Existing Forensics Tools
While many forensics tools may be capable of detecting PII,
two commercial forensics tools, Forensic Toolkit (FTK)4 and
EnCase,5 were studied.6
Both EnCase and FTK run on Windows and provide
sophisticated digital evidence analysis functions such as
recovering deleted files, keyword and regular-expression
searching, registry viewing, e-mail and memory analysis, and
much more. The popular, versatile and free forensics tool the
Sleuth Kit (TSK) with an advanced interface, PTK,7 can also
perform most of the same tasks. These tools can be used on
offline as well as running systems.
Finding PII Using Forensics Tools
The forensic tools were applied to interrogate the same
dataset tested by the PII tools. The results were then
incorporated into figure 1.

Figure 1—Test Files and the Results
SENF
No

Identity
Finder
No

No

No

No

No

File Name
My Recent Documents

Description of the file
A folder containing a link file that links to text.txt

SSN test file.pdf

A PDF file containing Social Security numbers

No

Text.jpg

A text.txt file, renamed to a JPEG file

No

Earnings.xlsx

Excel spreadsheet

FOUND

PII detection test.ppt

PowerPoint slides

FOUND

SSN test file.docx

Word document with Social Security numbers in
content

FOUND

Word document with Social Security numbers in
summary (metadata)

No

No

It was printed to generate a print spool file (*.emf)

No

Deleted Social Security numbers test file
ScreenShotWithSSN.png

A screen shot containing Social Security numbers

textFileCyptoClass.rtf
Text.txt
Text-deleted.txt
PII test.zip

RTF
Text file
Deleted text file (after recycle bin emptied)
Zip file containing text.txt and Social Security
number test file.docx
Outlook file with e-mail not deleted

SSN test file-deleted.docx

pst file

deleted pst file
File with SSN in alternate
stream
File in recycle bin
RAM and page files

FindSSN Spider
No
No

FOUND

FTK
FOUND by
following
link
Viewable *

EnCase
FOUND by
following
link
Viewable*

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND

No

No

FOUND

FOUND

No

No

FOUND

Viewable *

Viewable*

No

No

No

No

FOUND

FOUND

No

No

No

No

Viewable *

Viewable*

FOUND
FOUND
No
FOUND

FOUND
FOUND
FOUND
FOUND

FOUND
FOUND
FOUND
FOUND

FOUND
(limited
support)
No
No

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND
FOUND

FOUND
FOUND

FOUND
FOUND

FOUND
FOUND

FOUND

FOUND

FOUND
FOUND
No
FOUND
No

FOUND FOUND
No

No

FOUND FOUND

FOUND FOUND
FOUND FOUND
No
No
FOUND
No
No

No

Outlook file with e-mail deleted
No
No
No
Word document with Social Security numbers in
No
No
No
alternate data stream
File deleted but recycle bin not emptied
FOUND FOUND FOUND
FOUND
Contents of memory with Social Security numbers
No
No
No
Unknown
in memory
Windows registry
PII written to Windows registry
No
No
No
FOUND
* While the tools are not capable of searching these files directly, they allow display of the enclosed image using gallery view.
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Both Encase and FTK offer live and static data search
functions that support pattern matching using regular
expressions. For example, a search might be conducted to
identify files containing Social Security numbers using the
pattern: <\d\d\d[\- ]?\d\d[\- ]?\d\d\d\d\> (where \d represents
a “digit”). Using this search, the forensic tools discovered
Social Security numbers from all deleted files, the signature
mismatch file, the ppt file, RAM and page file, e-mail including
deleted e-mail, link files, and registry hives. Data that had been
hidden in the alternate data stream were revealed as well as
the PII stored in the metadata of the file. These are not trivial
differences. A file containing PII in its metadata would not be
discovered by any of the previously discussed PII tools, since
they focus only on file content. Using a process called signature
analysis, the PII hidden in a file with its file extension changed
from .txt to .jpg is also easily discovered by the forensics tools.
The signature analysis process identifies and corrects the
changed extension by comparing the file extension with header
information stored in a file.
Even though the powerful live search reveals many results
that were missed by the PII identification tools, the sensitive
information hidden in graphics files, a print spool file and a
PDF file were not detected by live search. The authors also
utilized other technologies (built into the forensic tools) to
uncover the rest of the PII information:
• Graphics files—To identify sensitive information hidden
in graphics files, the authors used the Gallery/Graphics
View feature. By clicking the Graphics/Gallery View tab,
all graphic formats including EMF, BMP, TIFF, JPEG, PNG
and GIF are displayed. The operator can then view the
files to make a determination about the sensitivity of the
image content.
It may be possible to convert image files to text using optical
character recognition (OCR) techniques. Regular-expression
searches can then be employed to search for strings in the
resulting files. This capability is not currently a feature of
for-free or for-pay forensic tools, but such capabilities could
improve PII scanning exercises as well as the forensics tools.
• Print spool files—Forensics tools support data carving that
allows an investigator to search for EMF, GIF, JPEG, PDF,
HTML and MS Office document files embedded in other
files or unallocated space. This feature can recover deleted
files embedded in unallocated space as well as the EMF
files embedded in print spool files. Even though the EMF
5
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files are deleted after the print is done, forensics tools are
capable of recovering deleted EMF files from unallocated
space. Once the EMF file content has been recovered, the
information is then viewable using the forensics Graphics
View feature described previously.
• PDF files—Regular-expression live search does not support
searching for PDF files. PDF files must be converted to
text using OCR techniques for the live search. For this
research, the authors viewed all PDF files via EnCase/FTK’s
Transcript/Native View tab. This is not a viable solution if
there are many PDF files to be searched. Deleted PDF files
can be recovered using the data carving feature.
In summary, using the forensic tools, all of the traditional
locations for PII, as well as many areas in which PII could
be intentionally or inadvertently hidden, can be searched.
Forensics tools can add significantly to the results provided by
PII tools.
CONCLUSIONS
A fundamental strength of forensics tools when used for
detecting sensitive information is that they can recover deleted
files and embedded images, list all alternate streams for each
file, and perform signature analysis before conducting a search
for sensitive information. A search using forensics tools not only
checks the file content, but also examines file slack, metadata,
links and other content. As a result, forensics tools are capable
of discovering more information than the PII detection tools
that were evaluated. They provide an additional source of
information by which a PII search can become more effective
and uncover more potential sources of PII.
However, there is no single tool capable of effectively
finding all PII. Each of the tools has its strengths and
weaknesses. This article was intended to address data that are
likely to be missed by currently available PII tools. Forensics
tools can be a powerful addition to the auditor’s toolbox,
providing additional capabilities to reveal sensitive data. If
an auditor uses only PII tools, it is possible that sensitive
recoverable information will be overlooked.
Organizations concerned about unauthorized
dissemination of sensitive information should be aware
of the limitations of their current PII tools and use this
knowledge to make decisions about potential data leakage or
compromise. Otherwise, it might be interpreted as a failure
to adhere to privacy laws or regulations that could subject the
organizations to legal liability or negative publicity.
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